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     1 I owe this turn of phrase to John Dunn who uses it in reference to the "United" Kingdom;
see his Western Political Theory in the Face of the Future(Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1979), p.5.
     2 A particularly clear formulation of this position is provided by Robert Gilpin in "Has
Modern Technology Changed International Politics?" in J. Rosenau, et. al. eds., The
Analysis of International Relations (New York; Free Press, 1972).
     3 The best treatments of these issues are R.B.J. Walker, "Realism, Change and International
Relations Theory" International Studies Quarterly (March, 1987) and "History and
Structure in the Theory of International Relations" Millennium: Journal of International
Studies (Summer, 1989).  See also Robert W. Cox, "On Thinking About Future World
Order" World Politics (January, 1976).
To speak of the "future" of strategy is to reveal a deep tension within the way in which we comm only think
about the subject.  On the one hand we are confronted by apparently revolutionary changes in the geo-political
landscape.  The transformation of Europe, the perhaps imm inent fragmentation of what is still derisively known as
the Soviet "Union,"1 and the  devolu tion of the W arsaw Pact, to nam e on ly a few , are all facto rs which conspire to
force upon us the belie f that the Co ld W ar - a term  which has in varying degrees been alm ost synonymous with
strategy for alm ost ha lf a cen tury no w - and perhaps all that goes with it, is rapidly becoming a historical artifact.  The
course of events, and the words of m any po litical leaders, comm entators, and even national publics, all seem to force
us to th ink  very seriously about th e fu ture of stra tegy  in such a wo rld.  
On the obverse side of this coin, however, things are not nearly so clear.  For in the tradition of thin king
about strategy which has grown up within the  period of the Cold War it is difficult even to think about the "future"
of strategy in any m eaningful sense .  In this conception, deeply indebted to (perhaps quintessentially representative
of) the neo-rea list tradition of internation al relations theory, it makes no real sense to  speak of the "future" o f strategy
at all.  Strategy, like international relations in general, is a realm  of tim eless precep ts and  princip les.  Specific
institutions, distributions o f power, and espec ially technology m ay change, but the  essence of  strategic reality is
eterna l.2   The  strategic realities of Thucydides and Sun Tzu, of Clausewitz and Frederick the Great, as well as the
more  tangible reality  of the  Cold  War, remain  essentially unchanged.  
These principles of statecraft are not themselves open to transformation.  They represent the eternal nature
or essence of international relations, and thus of strategy itself.  In this sense, therefore, it makes no sense to speak
of the  future  of strategy; the fu ture, like the  past and present, are red uced to an eternal mom ent.3
It is this tension between the fundamental transformations which appear to be concretely occurring and the
theoretical framework through which we seek to com prehend them  which  seem s to me to constitute the mo st
fundamental challenge, bo th theoretically and  practically, to thinking about strategy today.  Yet the meeting of such
a challenge does not require a complete rejection of all existing conceptions of strategy.  One  does not have to  begin
de novo, as it were, to construc t a theory o f strategy w hich  can m ove beyo nd th is tension.  That reconstruc tion is
needed is beyond doubt; but it is my conviction that the seeds fo r such a po tential transformation already exist - albeit
largely unacknowledged -within contemporary strategy.  A recognition of this potential, however, requires the
adoption of a manner of thinking about contem porary strategy quite different from that currently dom inan t.  It
requires a broad reconsideration of the relationship between strategic studies and the neo-realist theory of
international relations upon which it is founded.
An understanding of the issues at stake in considering the future  of strategy must go beyond the relatively
narrow field of strategic studies.  It draws upon themes current within, and possess implications for, many of the most
     4 Freidrich Kratochwil and John G. Ruggie, "International organization: a state of the art on
the art of the state" International Organization (Autumn, 1986).  See also Kratochwil,
"Regimes, Interpretation and the 'Science' of Politics: A Reappraisal" Millennium: Journal
of International Studies (Summer, 1988).
     5 Two examples among an almost infinite number of possibilities are: Barry Buzan, An
Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military Technology and International Relations (London:
MacMillan/IISS, 1987) and John Garnett, "Strategic Studies and Its Assumptions" in J.
Baylis, et. al. Contemporary Strategy Vol. I, 2nd ed., (New York: Holmes & Meirer, 1987)
Ch.1.
fundamental debates currently under way within the discipline of International Relations as a who le.  Most
importantly, it involves the en tire question o f the ch allenge  to neo-realism  by "in terpretivist" conceptions.   In
particu lar, what Friedrich Kratochwil and John R uggie have convincingly dem onstrated in  their analysis of the
relationship between regime theory and neo-realism m ust be recognized as holding equally true in contemporary
strategic debate: the epistemological stance of neo-realism stands in direct con tradiction to the fram ework of ana lysis
and ontological conception of states adopted by the so-called Third W ave w hich  dom inates m uch  of contem porary
thinking about strategy.4  The ontological claims which provide the very content of Third W ave strategic think ing,
and its self-defining opposition to the forms of analysis wh ich dom inated  the preced ing Second W ave, bring it into
contradictio n w ith the  epistemologica l stance underly ing the  neo-realis t theory  wh ich  it cla ims to represent.  
The recognition of this fundamental contradiction at the heart of contemporary strategic thinking has
important theoretical and practical implications.  From a theoretical standpoint it leads to a re-engagement between
strategic studies and current debates in International Relations theory, and to the startlingly ironic realisation that
con tem porary strategic thinking  may find its natural evolution in the direction of recent attempts to develop a
"critical" theory of international politics.  At the level of practice, it is vitally important in determining the ways in
which we understand, and thus react to, the transformations curren tly at wo rk in the realm of internation al security
in th is ap parently p ivotal e ra.  
In both cases the question of the "future" of strategy is amongst the most important and interesting issues
confronting the contemporary study of international politics.  But to more fully understand the way in which the
strategic thinking of the Third W ave leads contemporary strategy beyond itself, and into a real sense of the future,
it is necessary to return to the past.  In this case that past is the relationship between strategic studies and the neo-
realist theory of internationa l relations.
Rationality and Neo-Realism
Neo-realism provides the very foundation of the contemporary discipline of strategic studies.  But the
foundations of neo-realist theory itself rare ly receive a sufficient treatment in discussions of strategy.  The neo-realist
invocation of the "condition of anarchy" and the resultant "security dilemm a" in which states find themselves, has
become virtually ritualistic as an introduction to discussions of strategy.5  Yet it is rare that the theoretical foundations
of neo-realism itself are exposed to serious discussion.
Now obviously to expect a full analysis of the neo-realist framework as an introduction  to any and  every
strategic analysis would be unreasonab le.  But it is this silence, the virtual non-existence of any such an alysis within
the discipline, which is striking.  More to the point, man y of the con fusions and controversies in recent strategic
debate are a direct consequence of th is lack of theoretical clarity.  It is not my inten tion to  provide a full discussion
of neo-realism  and  its relation to  strategic stud ies in this context.  It is possible , however, to open up the issue  through
3     6 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 5th edition (New York; Knopf, 1973) p.4.
     7 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics  (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, p.226.
     8 One need only read the first four chapters of Kenneth Waltz's Theory of International
Politics (Reading Mass.; Addison-Wesley, 1979) to get a sense of this diversity.  On this
theme see also Alexander Wendt, "The agent structure problem in international relations
theory" International Organization (Summer, 1987). 
It is a failing of some recent "critical" theory that despite its avowed concern with the
'reifying' consequences of neo-realism it has itself tended to reify the complex and often
contesting themes which constitute the Realist tradition into a single abstraction called
'Realism'.
an examination one of the central postulates of neo-realist theory: the concept of rationality, the positing of states as
rational actors, and the relationship of these concepts to the theoretical - most especially epistemological - foundations
of neo-realism.  
At the m ost fundamental level it is important to recognise , as both  its proponen ts and its critics have pointed
out, that neo-realism  does not c laim  sim ply  to represen t a body of opin ion  regarding inte rna tional rela tions.  On the
con trary it claims to ground and justify its analyses in strict opposition to the vicissitudes of opinion and  subjective
interpretation, hold ing rather that it is founded upon the more secure tenets of science, of the objective representation
of reality - the way the  world is.
I do not wish to enter here into the com plex, often  interesting but occasionally obfuscating, debates over the
status of the neo-realist theory of international relations as a "positivist-inspired" endeavour.  At any rate the issue
is too large to be adequately dealt with in this context.  What I do want to emphasise, however, is the way in which
neo-realism  is not simply a claim about the nature of international relations, but a claim to know: specifically a
"scientific" claim to know , objectively, the reality of international relations.
The  importance o f this theme in neo-realist thinking cannot be underestimated.  In what remains in many
ways the classic treatmen t, Hans M orgenthau  included  it in the first of six principles of political realism, arguing that:
"Rea lism believing as it does in the o bjectiv ity of the laws of politics, must also believe in the possibility of
developing a rational theory that reflects, however imperfectly and one-sidedly, these ob jective laws.  It believes also,
then, in the possibility of distinguishing in politics between truth and opinion - between what is true objectively and
rationally, supported by evidence and illuminated by evidence and  illum inated by reason, and what is only a
subjective judgement, divorced from the  fac ts as  they are an d in formed by pre jud ice and w ishful thinking."6
It is this belief in appropriateness of the physical sciences as the model for all knowledge, and the  desire to
separate objective truth from  subjective op inion w hich continues - despite considerable d iversity in its embodiments -
to unite the neo-realist study of international politics.  More recently, for example, Robert Gilpin has provided an
explicit restatement and recognition of neo-realism 's link to the objective, scientific , conception of  knowledge
emerging from the Enlightenment: "An offspring of modern science and the Enlightenment" he writes , ". . . Realism
is based on the practice of states, and it seeks to understand how states have always behaved and presum ably always
will behave."7
There are important differences in the analytic foundations of each of these thinkers.8  What each  shares,
how ever, and what is central to the neo-realist tradition, is a fundamental desire to place the study of international
4     9 That this presupposes a particular conception of science, and that what science is is a
highly contested question in itself, should be self-evident.  Unfortunately this too is an
issue beyond the scope of the present essay.  For some reflections on the question see:  R.
Keat and J. Urry, Social Theory as Science (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 2nd ed.,
1982); and Peter T. Manicas, A History and Philosophy of the Social Sciences (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1987).
     10 Cox, "On Thinking About Future World Order" p.178; emphasis added.  The paradigmatic
treatment in this vein remains Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Relations (Reading
Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
Two excellent recent treatments of the entire question of neo-realism, epistemology and
social theory are: David Campbell, "Recent Changes in Social Theory: Implications for
International Relations" and Jim George, "The Study of International Relations and the
Positivist/Empiricist Theory of Knowledge: Implications for the Australian Discipline";
both may be found in R. Higgot, ed., New Directions in International Relations?, Australian
Perspectives (Canberra: Department of International Relations, 1988).
     11 This is too large a theme to be dealt with here; however two sources in the history of ideas
are in this context invaluable.  For a succinct treatment see: Albert O. Hirschman, The
Passions and the Interests (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1977).  More extensive
is J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1975).
     12 An analysis of Morgenthau as a Weberian is well traced in R. Turner and S.Factor, Max
Weber and the Dispute Over Reason and Value (London: Routledge and Keegan Paul,
relations on "objective" foundations.  If  the discipline of International Relations is ever to be placed on secure
foundations, and proceed toward the knowledge we so desperately need, it must conform  to the tenets of objective
know ledge as thy have deve loped  in other sciences.
In epistemological terms this means that the discipline must adopt the approach of science itself.9  It must,
in short, treat the phenomena under consideration as objects.  In this sense the epistemological approach underlying
the neo-realist theory of in ternational rela tions is essentia lly positivistic.  Rob ert Cox's summary of th is
epistemological position is particularly clear, he writes: "Positivism denies the relevancy, for an understanding of the
social world, of the inward and  outward duality of human institutions and events.  Scientific method for the study
of society is conceived as analogous to that evolved for the  study of the  wo rld of nature.  Human agents and actions
are reduced to their outward phenomenal aspects, and science is thought of as a rationality to be discovered in the form
of regularities in the relationships among externally observed phenomena.  The progress of science is equated to the
cumula tive  discovery of law s in the  form of consequences th at are predictable  under prescribed conditions."10
Now the nature of human action, subjectivity, provides a consistent difficulty for such an epistemological
stance.  In the tradition of thought from which the neo-realist theory of international relations emerges, this problem
is overcom e throu gh an  appeal to the un iversality of ration al self-interest.11  It is the positing of a unitary state-as-actor
as the bearer of this rationality which provides the solution to this fundamen tal problem.  The concept of rational self-
interest provides the theoretical bridge in neo-realism's conversion of  subjectively grounded state actions into the
externally observable "objective phenomena" required by a positivist epistemology.  In the Weberian appraisal of
Hans Morgenthau,12 or in the more overtly socio-scientific idiom of micro-economics and rational-choice theories
51984).
     13 Richard K. Ashkey, "The Poverty of Neorealism"  International Organization (Spring,
1984).  See also Wendt, "The agent-structure problem" on this issue.
     14 The classic analogy here, of course, is Kenneth Waltz's use of Rousseau's parable of the
stag hunt in Man, the State and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).
Although the idiom differs in his Theory of International Politics the essential position
remains unaltered.
     15 This could scarcely be more clearly stated than it is by Morgenthau in his first two
"Principles of Political Realism".  See op. cit. pp.4-8.
     16 A nice treatment of this theme, though specifically limited to questions of foreign policy
analysis is Miriam Seiner, "The search for order in a disorderly world: worldviews and
prescriptive decision paradigms"  International Organization (Summer, 1983), pp. 373-413.
favoured by m any contem porary analysts, the conception  of state  action as the instrumen tally-rational pursuit of self-
interest is th e foundation of theoretical analysis.  
It is this very assum ption  which provides the foun dation for neo-realism .  Although h is approach  is critical,
Richard  Ash ley's charac terisation  of this fo und ation  is in this regard completely accurate.  "For the neo-realist," he
writes, "the state is ontologically prior to the international system.  The system's structure is produced by defining
states as individual unities and then by noting the properties that emerge when several such unities are brought into
mutual reference.  For the neo-realist, it is impossible to describe in ternational struc tures withou t first fashioning a
concept of  the  state-as-ac tor."13  
Despite its consistent invocations of the concept of "structure," the neo-realist theory of international
relations is fundamentally grounded in a particular conception of states and state action.  In neo-realist theory the
sovereign nation-state is  decla red to the "subject"  within international relations.  The particular state, as the rational
individua l, looks to its ow n interests first.  Despite the  fact tha t in the long term  this interest  might be better served
through cooperation, each state cannot rationally assume that all states would act in a cooperative fashion, therefo re
it acts solely in its own interest, and all others do the same.14
The essence of the neo-realist conception of international relations is thus not simp ly the postulate of
anarchy, but the assumption of a particular form of rationality in state action as both the source and outcome of that
anarchy.  In the neo-rea list theory  of internation al relations the key to un derstan ding the rational natu re of rea lity is,
paradoxically, rationality itself.15
It is this adoption of a specific conception of states as rational actors which provides the foundation of neo-
realist theory.  Since  all states are held to  be equally rational, or are forced by the "security dilemm a" to beco me so
in order to survive, it becomes possible for both the statesman and the scholar to calculate the actions and reactions
of the actors on  such a basis.16  This form  of ac tion, once un derstood, is applicab le to all tim es and in all places, and
thus allows interna tional relations to be subsumed under, and comprehended within, the fram ework of a positivistic
science. 
Through  the theoretica l mediation of  rationa l self-interest and a unitary state-as-actor the "subjective" actions
of states are rendered  "objective."  Neo-realism thus constructs a "science" of  interna tional politics w hich  claim s to
have discovered  the  eterna l na ture an d objective operatio n of the world system.  
6     17 While game theory represents an extreme example of the application of the rational actor
model it is important not to completely identify Second Wave strategic thinking with game
theory itself or overstate the impact which explicitly game-theoretic approaches had on
strategic analysis.  Useful correctives are Hedley Bull, "Strategic Studies and its Critics"
World Politics (July, 1968) and, more expansively, Barry O'Neill, "A Survey of Game
Theory Models on Peace and War" in R. Aumann and S. Hart, eds, Handbook of Game
Theory (forthcoming).  It is not so much pure game theory as it is the adoption of the
universal, instrumentally-rational actor as the foundation of analysis - in whatever broader
theoretical context it may be embedded - which defines Second Wave thinking.
     18 The terms in quotations refer, of course, to three representative works within the tradition:
Glenn Snyder's Deterrence and Defense (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961);
William Kaufmann, "The Requirements of Deterrence" in Kaufmann ed., Military Policy
and National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956); and Thomas Schelling
The Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960).
     19 On "strategic man" or, as Bull referred to the concept "homo strategicus", see Ken Booth,
Strategy and Ethnocentrism (London: Croom Helm, 1979) and his searching analysis
"American Strategy: The Myths Revisited" in K. Booth and M. Wright, American Thinking
About Peace and War (Sussex; Harvester Press, 1978).
This system  operates, as it were, in a self-perpetuating feedback controlled  manner.  Not only is  it claimed
that international politics itself is based upon instrumental reason, but its analysis also follows its dictates.  In practice
this allows Reason  to becom e synonymous with  calcu lation and a  universally applicable strategic/instrumental
rationality.  In terms of theory it  al lows for the same exclusion of value and universality of instrumen tal calculation
which makes possible a positivistic analysis of interna tional relations and  which allows neo-rea lism to lay claim  to
the  title  of "objective sc ience.". 
 It is only through this transformation of states into objects that neo-realism can adopt and maintain the
positivist epistemology on w hich it bases its c laim  to scientific know ledge.   They becom e epistem ological objec ts,
"units," whose actions are subject to the predictive and explanatory requirements of a positivistic conception of
science and  knowledge.  Th e link between the ontological claim  of neo-realism  concerning the nature of states and
the ir ac tion and  the  epistemologica l stance through w hich it c laim s to know  are inextricably bound  together. 
Neo-realism in The Second Wave 
In nuclear strategy the instrumentalist foundation of neo-realism found its clearest and most vociferous
application in the analyses of the so-called Second Wave of strategic thinking.  In its most extreme cases it took on
the highly formalised structure of game theory.17  In wh atever form , however, it adopted the concept of the universal
rational actor and applied it to question of nuc lear strategy.  The cha racteristic analyses of the relationship between
"deterrence and defence," the "requirements of deterrence" and the "strategy of conflict," all bear the distinctive m ark
of this theoretical heritage.18
But the adoptions of "strategic man" (or perhaps "American" strategic man)19 which is the centre of  this form
of analysis was not simply the result of an unconsciously ethnocentric projection.  This is only part of the puzzle.
It is absolutely essential to grasp its theoretical significance, that is, to emphasise the essential role which this concept
7     20 The most important single work in this vein is probably Alexander George and Richard
Smoke, Deterrence and American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1974).  See also Robert Jervis' extensive review "Deterrence
Theory Revisited" World Politics (January, 1979) pp.289-324.  Note, however, that George
and Smoke seem largely to concede the assumptions and conclusions of the Second Wave
concerning "strategic" deterrence, and differ primarily as it concerns lower levels of
application.  In this they differ, in varying degrees, from subsequent Third Wave theorists.
or assumption plays in allowing strategic studies to meet the positivist epistemological criteria which it inherits from
the neo-realist theory of international relations.
"Strategic man" is not simply an afterthought or an idiosyncratic a priori upon which a theory of strategy
cou ld be co nstruc ted.  Quite the  con trary.  It also em erges, as we have  seen, from a long - though again  quite
culturally specific -evolution in the understanding of the social sciences themselves.  "Strategic man" is in fact the
necessary foundation for the entire conception of theory and knowledge which this conception of understanding social
life sought to fu lfil.
"Strategic  man," to put it another way, was a means of turning actors into objects and allowing them to be
subsumed under a positivistic theory of knowledge.  The abstract and deductive structure of the theory is founded
upon a set of assumptions about the nature of the actors themselves.  But these assumptions are themselves grounded
in the epistemological requirements of a posi tivist theory of knowledge.  "S trategic m an" is not simply an
unselfconscious a priori: it is a means, a necessary means, through which the study of the human phenom ena of
strategy may m eet the  requirements of a positivist co nception of know ledge.  It is thus an indispensable element not
only of the Second  Wave of strategic thinking, but of the neo-realist theory of international relations itself.
To miss this element is to miss a fundamental dynam ic in the  relationship between the theory of knowledge
underlying the Second Wave and the concrete analyses which it presents.  There are, no doubt, a num ber o f other
factors which go to m ake up the story.  But for the relatively  limited purpose we are pursuing here it  is this element
which is crucial not only in understanding the Second Wave, but in grasping the significance of that which constituted
- and continues to constitute - a  reaction again st it: the so-ca lled Third W ave o f strategic thinking.
Neo-realism and the Third Wave  
The  Third Wave of strategic thinking, em erging in the m id-1960s , centred  prim arily around oppo sition to
the abstrac t rationalism which dom inated  the strategic  theorising of the Second  Wave.  Initially, Third  Wave
theorising stressed the need to apply inductive methodologies and called upon  the evidence of concrete historical
experience to counter and correct the m isconception emerging from the abstract rationalism  and  deductive  structure
of Seco nd W ave analyses of stra tegy.  It stressed unacknowledged  com plications and questions in the actual historical
practice of deterrence, and suggested theoretical refinements such as the notion of bounded rationality.20  Despite such
concerns, these "early" Third Wave analyses tended to rem ain largely with in the  identifiable, ration alistic, fram ework
of neo-realism.  In the mo re recent development of Third Wave analyses, however, fundam ental issues  implicit in
these early arguments have emerged with greater force.
For the m ost part, the development of strategic thinking in the Th ird W ave has evo lved in  two clearly
discernable directions, each of which is representative of the broader schism between theories of "deterrence as
8     21 For an analysis of the history of strategic theory as a continuing conflict between these two
conceptions see: Gregg Herken, Counsels of War (New York; Knopf, 1985).
     22 I should note that I am far from satisfied with these labels.  They seem, however, as
adequate as (or at least no more inadequate than) other possible distinctions such as those
between "assured deterrers" and "warfighters" or theorists of "retaliation" versus those of
"denial".  
     23 John Steinbrunner, "Beyond Rational Deterrence: The Struggle for New Conceptions"
World Politics (January, 1976) p.231.
     24 Ibid. p.231.
den ial" and "deterrence as retaliation" which predates the Third W ave and continues to  dom inate strategic thinking.21
Categorizing strategists is, of course, a notoriously risky business; but though the terms may be somewhat misleading
I have found it simplest to refer to those strategists who  continue to make the case for a  conception o f nuclear strategy
centred around Assured Destruction as strategic "liberals."  Conversely their opp onents, whose th inking tends to
revolve around  concepts of nuclear uti lisation and  theories o f denial, I shall lab el strategic "conservatives." 22
In their ow n self-im ages, and in m ost conventional readings of the field as a whole, these tw o positions are
defined large ly in  opposition to  each o ther.  While I do  not w ish to m inim ise their differences, I will argue here that
they are in fact characterised by a fundam ental com monality.  This commonality ironica lly lies in the ir shared , though
almost wholly unacknow ledged, opp osition to the neo-realist theory of international relations.
Strategic Liberalism and the Appeal to Subjectivity  
The theoretical move of the liberal Third Wave is driven largely by a desire to rescue MAD  from the
apparently  dam ning parado xes to w hich to is su bject in "rational deterrence theory".  For John Steinbrunner, for
example, it is the paradoxical nature of Assured Destruction which provides the most troubling challenge to thinking
about nuc lear strategy.  The theory's cen tral postu late, the instrum entally-calcu lating ration al actor, results in the  long-
standing paradox that in the event deterrence should fail it would be irrational to carry out the threat of retaliation
upon which deterrence is based.23  Such a possibility, rationally considered, would appear to yield only one logical
outcom e: the need for a first-strike counterforce capability.  As he puts it: "If simple, direct and perfect rationality
existed  on both sides of the strategic confrontation, this paradox of the  retaliatory th reat would  presumably lead to
a pre-emptive counterforce attack by the first side truly understanding the conund rum ."24  This very logic, he
acknowledges, appears to undermine M AD and h as provided the impetus behind the emergence of counterforce and
"deterrence as denial" strategies.
In similar terms, Robert Jervis places the problem of the "stability-instability parado x" at the  heart o f his
analysis.  In purely rational deterrence  theory, stability at the strategic level of Assured Destruction would lead
logically  to a greater incentive for limited aggression, thus undermining the very deterrence it sought to achieve. The
mutual ability to carry out assured destruction renders the threat to respond to limited aggression in such a fashion
senseless and , as a result, is inherently lacking in credibility.  The strategies of denial: counterforce, limited nuclear
options and the like, again seem the logical conclusion.
Unlike their opponents, however, the liberal strategists are unwilling to follow this paradox down the logical
road to a counterforce doctrine and a theory of denial or victory.  Conceding its apparent logic, they nonetheless deny
9     25 Words which form the title of Chapter Three in The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).
     26 Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, Chapters 5 and 6 especially.
     27 Patrick Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 19770 p.207.
its validity.  Rather they seek to defend a conception of Assured Destruction as the essence of nuclear strategy from
such a conclusion.  This defence has two comp onents.  The first is a techn ical-strategic a ttack upon  the very
possibility and p lausib ility of a stra tegy of denial, u tilisation o r victory.  This is the  level at w hich  most strategic
debate is conducted.  It is the second aspec t of the  argum ent, however, wh ich is m ore fundamental and m ore
interesting.  Though they may differ  in detail , this element of  the at tempts to defend MAD are fundamentally similar
in essence: in each case they involve an appeal to the nature of the ac tors them selves, tha t is, to hum an subjectiv ity
and its crucial place in the constitution and co mp rehension of "reality".
Strategic  reality, it is held, is fundamentally  different than it appears in the arid portrayals of rational
deterrence theory.  And the so urce o f this difference lies in the impact of the subjective nature of the actors who
com prise and create that reality.  Only through such an und erstand ing, and  the theoretica l transformation  which it
entails, can we avoid the apparently damning paradoxes and misleading conclusions yielded by "rational" deterrence
theory.
In Steinbrunner's case the appeal is to a "cybernetic" conception of decision-making.  He stresses the need
to understand that actors act within limited and limiting preconceptions, conceptual frameworks and institutional
routines.  The implication, and the empirical judgement, is that rational deterrence theory simply does not represent
the "reality" of the nuclear age.
Jervis' analysis is even more sweeping.  H e readily grants the apparent logic of the counterforce or
warfighting conception of strategy and deterrence.  The problem with such a way of thinking lies, he avers, no t in its
detailed logic, but in its failure to appreciate that such logic no longer applies in the situation within which we find
ourselves.  This is a situation which the  abstrac t rationalism of strategic  thinking has by and  large failed  to
comprehend.  Yet it  has not escaped the attention of the decision-makers who  actually confront and create that reality.
They have long recognised the fundamentally transformative nature of the "nuclear revolution" and have acted
accordingly.  They have co nsistently understood, accord ing to Jervis, that "MAD is a fact, no t a policy."25
In order to comprehend this fundamental shift we m ust also  transform our categories of analysis.  Jervis
emphasises the psychological and stresses the "sym bolic" na ture of nuclear politics.26  In each case the focus of attack
is upon the  rationa listic calcu lation w hich  is held  to dominate and mislead strategic thinking.  Again the foundation
of his critique is the subjective nature of the ac tors involved, and the claim that this reality is fundamentally different
than its misleading portrayal in rationalist deterrence theory.
Nor are these isolated examples.  In similar  terms Patrick Morgan argues that "we should step away from
overly simplistic conceptions of deterrence in favour of a model that is rooted in the real behaviour of governmen ts".27
He calls upon the idea  of "sensible" dec ision-m aking as the key to understand ing de terrence in the nuclea r age.  Again
it is abstract rationalism which is held  to  be the en emy o f understanding.  Finally, co nsider M cGeorge Bundy's
invocation of the co ncept of  "ex istential"  deterrence as  a m eans to p recisely the same en d.  
It is not m y purpose  to evaluate these proposed a lternatives.  The crucia l poin t is that all of these are
interpretations of the  nature of subjectiv ity and  assessm ents o f the implications of that subjectivity for the
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     28 Robert Jervis' recent analyses may mark something of a shift in this regard.  It is necessary,
he argues, to start to understand "the liability of our general social science tradition that
analyzes reality apart from the beliefs that both we as scholars and the actors themselves
hold." Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, p.176.  The implications of such an
understanding may be far more fundamental for theories of international
relations than he seems imply. 
understanding of reality.  In each case there is an appeal to the subjective constitution of reality by the actors who
com prise it. The very categories they invoke: psycho logical and cybernetic im ages, the politics of  sym bolic
representation, the existential co ndition of  hum anity confronting nuc lear apocalypse, are all claims about the very
nature of subjectiv ity itself.  
These "liberal" analyses are, in fact, interpretations of inte rpretations .  And  it is through  reference to th is
interpreted "reality" - which  they contrast to the unreality  of rationalist strategy -  that they seek to  defend M AD. 
The precise analyses that each pursues may be different - what, after all, does it mean to understand the nature of the
"sensible," not to mention the "existential"? - but all clearly stand outside the purview of the rationalistic, objective
science of neo-realism.  At the most fundamental level they constitute an interpretively-based challenge to the
foundations of that theory itself.
The positing of the universal instrumentally-rational subject which provides the epistemological foundation
of neo-realism, and the basis of its claim to the status of "objective science," is the very focus of the "liberal"  critique.
The appea l is to interpretive modes of understand ing itself represents a direct assault on the theoretical foundations
of neo-realism.  Yet these more fundamental implications have rarely been recognised or taken up within the field.28
Onto logical and epis tem ologica l cla ims continue to  coexist in  a co ntradicto ry and  often  confusing tension.  
Strategic Conservatism and the Appeal to Culture  
At first  glance the conservative Third Wave appears, and claim s to be, a classic exem plar of neo -realist
theorising.  In the v iew of on e of its m ost well-known proponents, Co lin Gray, this is true not on ly of the Th ird Wave
but o f strategists in gen eral.  "Strategists," he says, "may be termed and should acknowledge that they are, without
apologies, neo-realists."  While they must appreciate and take into account the criticisms of classical Realism wh ich
have engendered the prefix "neo", he co ntinues, the fundamentals o f strategists' assum ptions "are those  which fo rm
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     29 Colin Gray, Strategic Studies and Public Policy: The American Experience (Lexington:
University of Kentucky Press, 1982) p.188.  The all too easy conflation of these thinkers
into a unified "Realist tradition is itself highly problematic and misleading.  In this regard
Robert Cox's distinctions between the positions of Carr and Morgenthau are especially
important; see his "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations
Theory" Millennium: Journal of International Studies (10:2, 1981).  Morgenthau's own
sense of the distinction is clearly apparent in his review of Carr's Twenty Years Crisis; see
H. Morgenthau, "Surrender to the Immanence of Power: E.H. Carr", reprinted in
Morgenthau, Politics in the Twentieth Century Vol.3: The Restoration of American Politics
(Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1962) pp.36-43.  The entire theme of the creation
of the "Realist tradition" has been effectively dealt with in R.B.J. Walker, "The Prince and
'The Pauper': Tradition, Modernity and Practice in the Theory of International Relations"
in J. DerDerian and M. Shapiro, eds.,International/Intertextual Relations: Boundaries of
Knowledge and Practice in World Politics (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989). 
     30 His clearest statement on this issue is Strategic Studies and Public Policy: The American
Experience (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1982) pp.3-6
     31 See, quintessentially, Colin Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style, Ch.2. and Carnes
Lord, "American Strategic Culture" Comparative Strategy (Vol. 5, No.3, 1985).
the conceptual bedrock (or sand, in the appreciation of many theorists of international relations) of the  writings of
E.H . Carr, Nicholas Spykm an and H ans M orgenthau." 29
Nor are these foundations lim ited to the app ropriation of the  foundationa l concep ts of pow er and interest
in a condition of  self-help and anarchy .  Gray's epistemological position is d istinctly positivist.30
 When probed m ore deeply, how ever, this cla im to neo-realist foun dations proves to be illusory.  The
conservative Third W ave's adoption  of the  neo-realist ana lysis is limited alm ost en tirely to an off-hand appropriation
of the supposed verities of anarchy and power.  Indeed the very existence of conservative  Third Wave theorising is
based upon  an attack on  the  foundations of neo-realism.  To fully understand the way in which this reversal comes
about it is again necessary to grasp the relationship be tween th is conception and  that against which it defines itself:
the "Second Wave" theories of the so-called Golden Age of strategy, and the theory of Mutual Assured Destruction.
The attack of the conservatives upon Golden Age theorising in general , and upon MAD in particular, again
consists of two related themes.  The f irst , as we have already seen in our discussion of the liberal response, emerges
from a series of argumen ts concerning the logical inconsistency - and corresponding lack of credibil ity - of MAD.
Again, however, it is the second element which is more inte resting.  The essen ce of  the critiqu e is that the strategic
theorising of the Golden Age was (and its descendants remain) dominated by a series of ahistorical and ethnocentric
assum ptions.  These assum ptions, derived  from  pecu liarly Am erican  ways of th inking, have been extended by
strategists into universa l categories of an alysis regard ing strategic th inking and  action .  Golden A ge strategy, it is
claimed, erroneously assumed that everyone thought about strategy in the way in which a particular school of
Am erican  theorists thought about it.31 
The abstract rationalism of strategic theory which these ahistorical and ethnocentric analyses have made
possible is held  responsible  for a diminution of the political element of strategy.  Rather than understanding that
12
     32 There exists an obvious tension here between the rationalist-logical approach which
underlies the first element of the critique of MAD and the political-cultural argument which
constitutes the second.  In this context, however, this is an issue cannot be explored further.
     33 The paradigmatic example here is Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Can
Win a Nuclear War" Commentary (July, 1977).
     34 See Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style, Ch.3.
     35 See Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style, p.xiv.  
     36 This is not to say, by any means, that the 'conservative' Third Wave takes these
admonitions at all seriously enough or carries them out in an adequate or sophisticated
way.  What is important is the underlying challenge.  An excellent exploration of the
importance of questions of culture and ideology in international relations, and a critique
of the ways in which they are most often handled in the discipline, is R.B.J. Walker, ed.
Culture, Ideology and World Order, (Boulder; Westview, 1984).
strategy is a paramountly political endeavour, this recent strain of conservative strategy has argued, the thinking of
the Golden Age reduced it to a set of abstract calculations which obscured its political nature.32
The prim ary practical concern of these theoretical assaults, of course, has been the way in which the theorists
of the Golden A ge have understood the  Soviet Un ion and its  approach to strategy.33  The failure to comprehend the
particular nature of the Soviet state - its historical, cultural, political and ideological  distinctiveness - has led, in the
eyes of the Third Wave to a consistent misapprehension of Soviet strategy.  This misapprehension, in turn, has
resulted in fundamental flaws in American strategy and a concom itant failu re in its ability to deal successfully w ith
the Soviet Union.34
It is not my purpose  here to  deal w ith the sp ecific analysis of the  "Soviet threa t" provided by conservative
strategists of the  Third W ave, or w ith its ana lysis of the shortcom ings of  Am erican  strategic thinking.  W hat is
important to recognise is that this claim about the nature  of the Soviet state does not simply indicate a difference of
opinion within the framework provided by neo-realist theory.  It invokes a completely  different - indeed contradictory
- methodologica l approach from  tha t adopted  by neo-realism.     
The theoretical position of the Conservatives is based upon a critique of the assumptions about states and
state actions which are  incorporated in  Seco nd W ave th inking.  It represents, in  essence, a challenge  to the very model
of the universa l actor in  interna tional relations wh ich provides the foun dation for that thinking.  In arguing for a
renewed stress on history and politics - even an incorporation of the  insights o f cultural anthropo logy35 - the Third
Wave poses a fundam ental challenge to the  concept of the  universal instrumentally-rationa l actor w hich  underlies
"rational deterrence theory".  It represents a call for an understanding of historical and cultural difference and
relativity, and an app reciation of these factors for the political endeavour known  as strategy.36
If we take th is claim  seriously, how ever, it is apparent that this critique  need  not, indeed cann ot, consistently
be lim ited  solely to an assault  upon  Second  Wave strategy.  A stress on questions of culture, broadly conceived,
yields a set of concerns very different from  those em bodied in neo -realist theory.  It also inevitably en tails a shift in
epistemological orientation.  Taken seriously it marks a turn to interpretive o r hermeneutic modes of inquiry as
opposed to the positivistic stance adopted by neo-realism.   It is in fact an assault upon the very essence of neo-
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     37 Many of these issues are highly contentious and reflect some of the deepest and most
difficult issues in social theory.  What follows, therefore, is intended to be suggestive rather
than rigorous.   
Suggestively, one need only consider the long standing (and still vibrant) debates in
cultural anthropology - to which Gray appeals - which were set off by Peter Winch's early
analysis to see that the complexity of the questions raised by an appeal to cultural
understandings go far beyond the relatively superficial attempts advanced by Third Wave
realism itself.  The Conservative Third W ave rep resents a critique no t only of the strategy of the G olden  Age, but also
upon  the  theore tica l framework wh ich  it cla ims as its own foundation.  
In its critique o f strategic studies the Conservative Third Wave inadvertently opens up the possibility (indeed
declares that it is the reality) that states do not necessarily act, or have to act, in the instrumentally-rational fashion
which results in the fatalistic wo rld of neo-rea lism.  Now , obviously, this element the Th ird W ave has applied  its
theoretical critique in a strategically conservative way.  Moreover, it has remained unaware of the fundam ental
contradiction within its  ow n position.  It has continued  to see itse lf as secu rely grounded within the neo -realist theory
of international relations and to premise - and justify - its ana lyses w ithin its pa rameters.  This lack of awareness is
a source of theoretical confusion, bu t also provides the  Conservative ana lysis with considerable rhetorical power
through the ab ility to claim  both  the validity of its critique of the strategic rationalism of MAD and its grounding in
the necessities of power politics in a condition of anarchy derived from its supposed foundation in neo-realist theory.
Bu t this con fusion sho uld not be  allowed to  obscure the fact that the attack of the Conservatives upon the
theories of Mutual Assured Destruction and the Golden Age is in fact a  fundam ental c ritique o f the neo-rea list theory
which it claims as its very found ation .  Wh at is more, this critique can lead  strategy in d irections quite  different -
indeed  opposite - from those in which it has been taken  by this school of Th ird Wave strategists.
The very premise which  allows neo-realism to declare anarchy, insecurity and conflict to be the eternal
nature of international po litics, and the foundation of its scientific understanding, is explicitly denied by the critique
of the Third Wave.  Moreover, the claim of the conservative  Third W ave to  being rooted  in the su ppo sedly secure
foundations of neo-realism is subverted by the very content of its ow n existence .  This tension remains largely
unexam ined within the Third W ave itself, however it is a tension which canno t be ignored or wished away.
But the found ationa l critique of the Third Wave need not fall into this contradictory position nor be
developed in the conservative  vein in  which it has hitherto been proposed.  For the critique provided  by the  Third
Wave opens up the possibility of a renewed political sense of strategy in which the future again becomes one of
contingency and possibility.  The issues a t stake here are, on ce again, not sim ply ep istem ological or m ethodological;
they are also  onto logical and thus practical.  Questions of interpretation become contestable and, because they
explicitly involve judgements on present o r po ten tial s trategies , they also become politica l.  They relate not simply
to the theory of strategy but also to the relationship between that theory and the practice of strategy in the nuclear age.
The study and analysis of strategy itself thus becomes political in a sense far beyond  that im plied  by the  challenge
of the  Th ird Wave.  
The Future of Strategy
In opposition to the objectivist epistemological stance which dom inates neo-realism, a stress on subjectivity,
culture and  agency as ca tegories o f ana lysis requires the adoption of a interpretive stance .  The shift, in the  language
of G. H. von Wrigh t is from explanation to understanding.37  The actions of states - here the specifically "strategic"
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theorists.  
In an expansive literature see, as examples, Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science (New
York: Humanities Press, 1958); Alasdair MacIntyre, Against the Self-Images of the Age
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1978); P. Rabinow and W. Sullivan, eds.,
Interpretive Social Science (Berkeley: University of California Press,1979); M. Hollis and
S. Lukes, eds., Rationality and Relativism (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1984); G.H. von
Wright, Explanation and Understanding (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971).  
     38 A classic treatment of this entire issue is: Charles Taylor, "Interpretation and the Sciences
of Man" Review of Metaphysics (Fall, 1971).
It is important to note that it was precisely the desire to avoid the theoretical and practical
political difficulties and dilemmas which such a stance yields which, in part, provided the
impetus for the tradition of thought from which contemporary Realism emerges.  The
universality of rational self-interest was to provide not only an analytic foundation, a claim
about what is, but also a prescriptive or ethical admonition how these relations should be
ordered.
actions, cannot be studied as objective data, but must be understood through an analysis of the practices and structures
which they make and through which they are in turn made.
 Specifically, then, the study an d practice of strategy is not to be viewed solely as the process of instrumen tal
calculation in an objective condition of anarchy.  Both this attitude toward strategy, and its part in constructing
strategic reality, themselves become a  focus of study as  "sub jective"  practices rather than objective givens.  What is
more, other forms of interpretive understandings and practices may be advanced.  Cultu re, ideology, history a ll
become essential  elements in subtle, nuanced and particular understandings of how strategy has come to be seen,
constructed  and p ractised in different tim es and in  different places.
The epistem ological shift involved  in a move to interpretive understanding also en tails a transform ation  in
the ontological foundations of enquiry.  A stress on history, relativity and subjectivity - in short, on practices - implies
an ontological position very different from that of  neo-realism .  As soc ial constructions, practices becom e susceptib le
to critical self -ref lection and  thus to poten tial change .  In place of the eternal determinations of the nature of states
and the structures they create, history becomes a realm of contingency.
Strategy and strategic relations, in this view, also emerge as contingent historical constructions.  In theoretical
terms, the analysis of strategy becomes a process of critical self-reflection upon the practices adopted and their
interrelationship at particular historical, and especially political, conjunctures.  Timeless determinations of structure
and "objective" declarations about the eternal nature of strategy give way before concrete political practices and
possibilities.  
    The discourse of strategy is to be seen  as a po litical clash  of inte rpre tatio ns .  Mo reover, the practice of
strategy is to be seen as one of com peting or conflicting interpretations of strategic relations, politics, them selves.
The very strategic practices and analyses pursued reflects political judgements.  There is, then, no such thing as the
appeal to "objective" an alysis.  T here exist only better or worse interpretations.38  The grounds of judgement
concerning these interpretations are not purely empirical, they are also practical.  The question of whether the
conclusions they advance, and the prescriptions which flow from them , advance the cause of peace and security - and
even the very definitions of peace and security from which these theoretical conceptions emerge - become matters
of debate and judgement.  Strategy ceases to be a realm of purely instrumental calculation in an objective realm of
analysis, and becom es broad ly political its potentials and possibilities.
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     39 A clear example of this conflict is evident in Gray's admiring comments regarding the
methodological approach advanced in Ken Booth's Strategy and Ethnocentrism (London:
Croom Helm, 1979) and yet his disagreement with the concrete conclusions which Booth
puts forward.  Conversely, Booth's own appraisal of the school of strategic thinking
represented by Gray is, to say the least, highly critical.  See his: "Nuclear Deterrence and
World War Three: How Will History Judge?" in R. Kolcowicz, The Logic of Nuclear
Terror (Boston; Allen & Unwin, 1987).
     40 I am grateful to Keith Krause for an illuminating discussion of this issue.
     41 Robert Keohane, "International Organizations: Two Approaches" International Studies
Quarterly (December, 1988).
This more general theoretical reflection is clearly represented in the concrete analyses of Third Wave
analysts them selves.  They are far from  the "objective" analyses sought by neo-realism.  On the co ntrary, they are
particu lar, con testable  and  highly political interpretations.39  It is not possible, to reiterate, fo r this political natu re to
be hidden behind the purp ortedly objective and  scientific  analysis of neo-rea list theory , for it is precisely its
unrecogn ised opposition to  this  theory  wh ich  defines th e Third W ave.  
This realisation has num erous implications.  At the practical level it forces us  - like som e recen t work in
international political economy and in theories of international regimes - to take much m ore seriously the role of
norms and  values and  their part in the creation and maintenance of security relations.  The recent transform ations in
Europe, especially the process surrounding CSCE provide a prime illustration.40  The shift from a process of purely
instrumental calculation and a stress on the techn ical solu tion of an (ever elusive) "military balance" to one of a
comm on understanding and structure of security based upon a shared set of norms and values represents a situation
in w hich conventional ra tionalist analysis is e ither unhelpful or m isleading.   
CSCE may in fact represent a transformation from the attempt to manipulate technical factors affecting the
"logic of de terrence" to a  process concentrating on the  deve lopm ent of com mon foun dations of  a relationship built
on trust, on rules, norms and values which provide  the  foundation for an arch itec ture of m utual security.  This does
not mean that instrumental considerations becom e irrelevant, but the structure of possibilities which such an
understanding yields is considerab ly broader and po tentially m ore transform ative than one limited so lely to trad itional
rational calculation and the structural dete rminations of a "security dilemma" beyond the reach of those political
practices.
In theoretical term s the implications are equally far-reaching.  The  first bears on the relationship between
the debates in strategic theory  and the broader debates curren tly under way in In ternational Relations theory .  Robert
Keohane's recen t analysis, for exam ple, is generally op en an d sym pathetic to "interpretive"  - or he calls them
"reflective" - approaches, but cha rges them with a failure to generate concrete research strategies.41
The issues raised here are complex, but the  debates in stra tegy reflec t a direct concern with precisely these
issues.  Contrary to  Keohane's claims, the debates in strategy over the pas t fifteen o r so years have  been  precise ly
about the research agenda - and  the concrete political conseq uences, yielded by an  interpretivist stan ce.  It has been
a confused deb ate, due largely to its lack of theo retical self-consciousness and corresponding conflation of
con tradictory epistemologica l and onto logical stances;  but tho ugh  this  demonstrates its inadequacy, it also points
to its importance.
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     42 As well as those mentioned above, Joseph S. Nye's "Nuclear learning and U.S.-Soviet
security regimes" International Organization (Summer, 1987) stands as an exemplar of this
form of analysis.
     43 In addition to the works already cited see Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and
Decisions  (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1989).
     44 The most well-known attempt to reclaim Carr in this sense is probably Robert Cox's
"Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory".  The
recovery of Morgenthau in this sense sometimes appears to be a goal in the work of
Richard Ashley.
The purportedly neo-realist Third Wave unconsciously marks a fundamental, if incomplete, move away from
the trad itional neo-realis t framework.  The development of the fu ture of strategic studies thus comes to be reunited,
and bound up with the broader debates currently under way in international relations theory.  Each possesses
fundam ental im plications for the other.
Broadly conceived, there a re thus  at least three directions in which the future of strategic thinking may
develop.  Altho ugh each  possesses d ifferent methodological and practical im plications, this is not the venue in which
to undertake such an analysis.  R ather, I want simply to outline the directions in which the future of strategy - in a
theoretical sense, but always remembering that theory possesses powerful practical implications - may develop.
The first option involves a move in the direction of contem porary regime theory.  This may involve, on the
one hand, an engagement with recent attempts to add greater sophistication to neo-realism while still remaining
largely within its theoretical param eters.42   Conversely, those who regard the  recen t theoretical, especially
epistem ological, criticisms of regime theory as more fundam ental may find themselves drawn to the exploration of
theories of internation al regim es which  move considerab ly beyond  neo-realism .  Again  the work of John Ruggie and
especially Friedrich Kratochwil is exemplary in this regard.43
A second possibility lies in a return to some form  of "classical" R ealism  in the tradition of E.H. Carr or - in
some readings - Han s M orgenthau .  But R ealism , in this apprecia tion, is defined  in clear opposition to the timeless
determinations of objective structure  which define  neo-realism .   The tran sition m arked  by the  add ition of the prefix
"neo" to Realist theory is seen as more than simply a "taking account of criticisms".  It is viewed as a fundam ental
shift in the grounds of Realist thinkin g itself, a shift which is to be rejected.  Abstract structures are replaced by
sensitive and nuanced readings o f co m plex historical developments and contemporary political problems and
possibilities.44
This leads to a final, and certainly most ironic possibility.  Though it would probably be an anathem a to
many who identify themselves with  con tem porary Third W ave analysis, their theoretical found ations, fully
und erstood, share  fundam entally  the sam e theo retical stance as w hat is now com monly  referred  to as the  "critical"
movem ent in Inte rna tional Relations theory .  
This Critical M ovement, whatever its variants, has con sistently had at its centre a desire to recover the
historica l, the particular and the contingent in the study of wo rld politics.  Its own assault upon neo-realism has been
largely to these end s.  It has sought to place  the study of concrete practices o f self-regard ing agen ts back  at the centre
of the analysis of world politics.  This is not to say that there are not significant differences of approach w ithin th is
critical movement, bu t a rejection of the positivistic and rationalistic foundations of neo-realism tend to provide a
unifying theme.  In this desire it is at one with the critical impulse submerged within the Third Wave's  own position.
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     45 Any attempt to define so-called Critical theory as a unified school would be erroneous.
Robert Cox, for example, could (and probably should) be as easily placed in this category
as in the previous one.  This said, from among many possible examples of the approach -
as well as of its diversity - one might include not only the work of Ken Booth already
mentioned, but also that of Bradley S. Klein and G.M. Dillon.  See, for example, Klein,
"Hegemony and Strategic Culture: American Power Projection and Alliance Defence
Politics" Review of International Studies (14:2) and "How the West Was One: Representa-
tional Politics of NATO" International Studies Quarterly (September, 1990); and Dillon,
"Strategy, Discourse and Modernity" Current Research on Peace and Violence (Vol. 2,
1989).
The fundamental difference lies in the  willingness of C ritical Theorists to take these questions in a theoretica lly self-
conscious fashion and take  its categories of analysis much more seriously in relation to neo-realism itself than the
Third Wave has done.  If the Third Wave is to take seriously its own theoretical stance it may find a s its natural
outcom e a mo ve in the direction of Critical Theory.45
Critical Theorists have also sought to take seriously not only the epistemological or methodological
implications of such considerations.  The renewed em phasis on su bjectiv ity and practices brings with it a concomitant
need to reexamine fundam ental questions regarding those actions.  Questions of morality, ethics and justice - among
others - are no  longer defined as  beyo nd the bound s of scientific understanding.  They reemerge at the very centre
of ana lysis, as an integral part of the realm o f judgem ent and  decision concerning those ac tions.
These alternative futures for strategy place it squarely within the debates now occurring within International
Relations theory.  Strategic studies should not, indeed cannot, see itself as securely iso lated from these " theoretical"
debates.  It is not distinct from  them , it is - when  adeq uately  understood - right in the heart  of  them.  The
consideration of these issues is thus not to be seen  as the im position of some alien theoretical controversy on the
analysis o f stra tegy .  It em erges from the  inadequacy of contemporary strategic th inking itself.  In term s of both its
theoretical and its practical implications it is a debate which must be engaged.
A final consideration: the recognition of the latent sense of possibility within contemporary strategy, and
its opposition  to the timeless structures of neo-realism, presents once again the possibility that strategy does have a
future.  In a period of apparently revolutionary political change and opportunity, the ways in which those changes
are viewed and opportunities acted upon will be perhaps the fundamental determinants of the future of strategy and
security.  In a practical sense the nature of our theoretical reflections will be in no small part responsible for the
approaches we adopt to questions of strategy and security in a "post-Cold War" world.  Whether that thinking remains
trapped within the static categories bequeathed  by neo-realism or mo ves forward into new and  imaginative
conceptions of the  nature and  structure  of security in the nuclear age  represents the challenge  of contem porary
strategic thinking.
Whether the "future" of strategy, in both a theoretical and a practical sense, may be con structed out of a
con tem porary recovery of the "classical" trad ition of Realism , from a more theoretica lly self-conscious form of neo-
realism, or whether it could emerge from  one  of m any other possib ilities latent w ithin a renew ed sense o f possibility
made possible by critical or reflective approaches is itself, of course, a political and contingent question.  What such
conceptions may allow how ever, and what hum anity desperately requires, is that strategy have a future in a sense
which is truly m eaningful.
